SCADA industrial control systems exposed by security researchers

Security researchers showcased security flaws in software used to control critical industrial systems by oil, gas, water and electrical distribution plants at the 2012 SCADA Security Scientific Symposium.

The vulnerabilities ranged from information disclosure and privilege escalation bugs to remote denial-of-service (DoS) and arbitrary code execution flaws. The research team, which included Reid Wightman, Dillon Beresford, Jacob Kitchel, Rubén Santamarta and two other researchers who chose to remain anonymous, worked as part of a project called Basecamp that was sponsored by industrial control systems (ICS) security firm Digital Bond. The tested products were Control Microsystems' SCADAPack, the General Electric D20ME, the Koyo/Direct LOGIC H4-ES, Rockwell Automation's ControlLogix and MicroLogix, the Schneider Electric Modicon Quantum and Schweitzer's SEL-2032. Stuxnet, which is considered by many the most sophisticated malware of all times, exploited flaws in SCADA software from SIemens in order to inject malicious code in PLCs (Programmable Logic Controller) used to control uranium enrichment centrifuges at Iran's Natanz nuclear facility. Many of security problems uncovered by Project Basecamp stem from design flaws and lot of SCADA products have undocumented features that can be abused for malicious purposes. However, a more proactive approach, like taking security into consideration when designing these SCADA products in the first place, is needed. Original news was published at Techworld web site.